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This conceptual paper deals with important implications of ‘reciprocity’ in
marketing in emerging and developing business environments, such as East-
ern Europe. In mature, developed, high income, business systems, both
transaction and relationship based marketing have been well researched. We
posit that in less mature business systems, especially transition or emerging
economies, there is a third way to look at marketing and exchange, which we
call ‘reciprocity-stakeholder marketing.’ We believe that our framework shows
the importance of reciprocity, a fundamental concept in business, for market-
ing in emerging environments such as Eastern Europe. This paper provides a
meaningful starting point for empirical research for developing strategies in
Eastern Europe.
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Introduction
This conceptual paper deals with marketing implications of ‘reciprocity’ in
marketing in emerging and developing business environments. International
marketing is taking place within a context set by speciﬁc, identiﬁed stake-
holders (Woodbine, 2008; Zakhem, 2008) and in the institutions that sup-
port them. Marketing research is increasingly recognizing that in-order to be
effective; one needs to consider a broader range of stakeholders. Marketing
was seen too restrictive and single dimensional to be effective in the eyes
of the Nordic school of thought (Gummesson and Gronroos, 2012). Long
term interactive relationships and social networks, rather than transactional
exchange, are considered the core of research in marketing. In mature
business systems, both transaction and relationship based marketing have
been well researched (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Polonsky, Schuppisser, &
Beldona, 2002). We posit that in transition or emerging economies such
as Eastern Europe, there is a third way to look at marketing and exchange,
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which we call ‘reciprocity stakeholder marketing.’ We believe that our frame-
work shows the importance of reciprocity (Rosanas, 2008; Stevens, 2008),
a fundamental concept for marketing, in emerging environments such as
Eastern Europe. The Study of credible commitments that has been relatively
neglected in academic literature is explained by the assumption, common
to both law and economics, that the legal system enforces promises in a
knowledgeable, sophisticated, and low cost way (Berger & Herstein, 2012).
Understanding social capital is relevant for understanding what is go-
ing on within and between companies (Luoma-Aho & Vos, 2010). Doing
business in many post-Communist countries is very risky because of the
prevalence of bribery, extortion and organized crime penetration (Beekun,
Westerman, & Barghouti, 2005). In emerging and developing economies,
a traditional institutional base has been found striving toward the global
economy. In the initial stages of their transformation, such economies have
an institutional vacuum, where opportunism (Stevens, 2008; Donaldson,
2008) may be difﬁcult to overcome. If they are to succeed, they need some-
thing to support the exchange thus implementing the marketing process
in the short term. We believe that such a framework exists. It is an ap-
proach that provides temporary scaffolding within which the necessary new
institutions of both transactional and relational type can be constructed.
The literature, which has most inﬂuenced our thinking on stake-holder
marketing, is that on the role of institutions in economic development
(Rosanas, 2008; North, 1990; Olson, 1992) or in emerging and transition
economies (Kleinrichert, 2008). This paper contributes to this debate in two
ways. First by providing a framework for analysing international marketing,
which has to be effective across the divide between very different business
systems, Secondly, this paper sets out to integrate thinking on the signiﬁ-
cance of ‘ethical’ social institutions, especially in the context of emerging
globalization, for international marketing (Chiou & Pan, 2008; Choi, Hilton,
& Millar, 2004) in Eastern Europe.
We suggest that, in addition to these two institutional aspects of mar-
kets and relationship marketing, a third framework is appropriate, one that
is based on the concept of mutual hostage giving and taking (Schelling,
1960; Williamson, 1983; Hilton, Choi, Lee, & Millar, 1997) as a means of
establishing an irrevocable mutual commitment to a sequence of exchanges
out of which may develop a relationship of trust and consequent ongoing ex-
change. Such reciprocity provides an ethical aspect to marketing exchange
that can overcome the opportunism (Stevens, 2008; Zakhem, 2008) that
exists in emerging and developing business environments such as many
Eastern Europe countries.
Western institutions are generally built on the basis of trust in the gov-
ernment, regulatory agencies, and especially the judicial system, as well
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as other formal institutions (Beekun, Stedham, Yamamura, & Barghouti,
2003). In many Eastern European countries, these institutions are not fully
developed in the sense of Western economies (McCarthy, Puffer, Dunlap,
& Jaeger, 2012). In many cases, their culture is considered to be collec-
tive in nature (Hofstede, 2006). These countries have a century’s long tra-
dition with collectivism emphasizing the importance of unity and equality
(Michailova & Hutchings, 2006). For instance, in Russia, strong collective
instincts were encouraged in the countryside in pre-revolutionary times.
Collective farming was encouraged by the Tsars because of their fear of
anarchy and in an attempt to minimize natural disasters and increase pro-
ductivity. A strong cultural tendency, based on Communist ideology, is to
distrust individuals, groups, and organizations that fall outside personal so-
cial networks. This has been attributed to the perception that outsiders do
not share the same cultural values as group members and thus cannot be
trusted (McCarthy & Puffer, 2008). For example, during the Communist pe-
riod, the Communist party members placed themselves above the law. As
a result, rules and regulations were easily violated and this resulted in a
propensity for people not to value the judicial system and contracts. As a
result, business of informal social-based networks was such that the use of
personal social networks for attaining goods and services in short supply,
and for circumventing ofﬁcial procedures can be efﬁciently conceptualized
as the know-how of the Soviet system.
In a market economy, trust comes from formal institutions (such as
courts and its legal system) and from informal institutions such as busi-
ness ethics. For instance, in Communist Russia the markets were lead by
central planners. There was no need for strategic or marketing planning, it
was sufﬁcient that the products were sent to a predetermined ‘customer.’
It was necessary to build personal relationships with ‘planners’ and other
related ﬁrms as a prerequisite for gaining effective access to the markets.
Russia has been ruled by the Communist party for over 50 years. Today,
in post communist Eastern Europe, it is still important to build personal
relations with government ofﬁcials in-order to gain access to state property,
win state contracts, and avoid direct and indirect taxes (Puffer & McCarthy,
2011).
Credible commitments and credible threats share the following common
attribute: both appear mainly in conjunction with irreversible commitments
and a weak legal system. The idea of using hostage exchange to cre-
ate mutual incentives in a business context was originally suggested by
Williamson (1983). In Williamson’s model, the buyer and seller offer each
other hostages to guarantee against cheating. If the buyer cheats, the seller
may keep the hostage posted by the buyer; if the seller cheats, the buyer
keeps the hostage posted by the seller. This is used when trust and tradi-
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tion are weak or non-existent as opposed to cultures with long traditions of
‘saving face’ such as in China, a system called guanxi (Berger & Herstein,
2012).
Transactional Versus Relationship Marketing
Academic work on marketing since the 1990’s has primarily focused on
relationship based marketing exchange rather than transactional based ex-
change (Samiee & Walters, 2003; Kalafatis, 2002; Morgan & Hunt, 1994;
Vargo & Lusch, 2004). Transactional cost marketing takes into considera-
tion the costs incurred in the marketing of a product or a service. It takes
into account the speciﬁcity, frequency, limited rationality, uncertainty, and
opportunistic behaviour involved in an exchange. It claims that the best way
to meet a ﬁrm’s objectives is by satisfying its customers better than its
competitors. The origins of relationship marketing are in Europe, during the
1980s, as a result of the dissatisfaction with the transactional marketing
theory (Chattanon & Trimetsoontorn, 2009). Relationship marketing is seen
as the complex and long term relationship between exchange partners and
not simply as a series of transactions. These relationships are likely to rely
less on formal contracts and more on issues such as trust and reciprocity.
A common deﬁnition of relationship marketing was developed by Callaghan,
McPhail, and Yan (1995, pp. 10):
Relationship marketing centeres on the creation and maintenance of
the relationship between two parties of exchange, the supplier as an
individual and the consumer as an individual, through the possession
of the desire to be mutually empathic, reciprocal, trusting and to form
bonds.
Customer attraction but not customer retention is at the focal point of the
transactional based marketing theory, which develops, sells, and markets
products and services by means of short-term, discrete economic trans-
actions. The authors build upon the concern in the relationship marketing
literature regarding its effect on business interaction (Emerson, Alves, &
Raposo, 2011). This work distinguishes between the marketing needed to
support short-term, discrete exchange transactions and that required to
establish and maintain longer-term repeatable and repeated transactions
based on good relationships (Stevens, 2008; Donaldson, 2008) between
buyer and seller.
This literature indicates that the traditional approach to international
marketing saw exchange far too much in terms of what might be appropri-
ate in an idealised market with full transparency, perfect free information,
easy legal enforcement of contracts, and high rates of productive efﬁciency.
However, even in well evolved market-based societies, such as the United
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Figure 1 Gift versus Market Exchange – Identity
States, markets do not operate on such a basis, but ultimately always rely
on relationships as a sound basis for marketing (Chattananon & Trimet-
soontorn, 2009).
Research is increasingly revealing the fact (Samiee & Walters, 2003;
Alexander & Colgate, 2000; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Achrol, 1991; Bucklin &
Sengupta, 1993; Vargo & Lusch, 2004) that if one accepts the relationship
marketing view, one needs a fundamental paradigm shift. This needs to
take into account relational contracting (MacNeil, 1980) within a relational
marketing context (Dwyer & LaGace, 1986) that underlines the increased
importance of networking (Child & Tse, 2001) to establish effective partner-
ship based on both internal competition and relationships in an increasingly
global context. Figure 1 summarizes the concept.
Reciprocity and Stakeholders: Countertrade
Reciprocity is the component in a business relationship that enables giving
and receiving favours at a future date, a type of bilateral contingency for
a mutual beneﬁt (Berger & Herstein, 2012). Stakeholder theory was devel-
oped in-order to better map the ﬁrm’s environment and assist ﬁrms to more
efﬁciently identify and balance different needs (Luoma-aho & Vos, 2010).
A stakeholder is an individual or group that is affected or can affect the
performance of a ﬁrm (Freeman, 1984). Countertrade has been deﬁned as:
‘essentially barter trade in which the exporting ﬁrm receives payment in
terms of products from the importing country’ (Rugman & Hodgetts, 1995,
p. 168).
We believe that this view portrays matters a little too simply. Hammond’s
(2000) presents a slightly more complex approach that identiﬁes four types
of countertrade: barter, buybacks, offsets and counter purchase, that are all
considered as common in international business exchange in Central and
Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa (Hilton et al. 1997; Choi,
Lee, & Kim, 1999; Marin & Schnitzer, 1995).
Buybacks and barter are the direct exchange of goods between two par-
ties without foreign exchange and were common to trade within Central
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Europe (Robicheaux & El Ansary, 1976). Buybacks occur where one party
provides input into the production process of another party in return for
promising to purchase a proportion of the resulting output. Offsets take
place where a seller agrees to offset, partially or in total, the costs of
the buyer by subcontracting or co-producing (Thomsen & Pedersen, 1999).
Counter purchase is the promise of one party to purchase the goods of the
other party at a later date in return for delivering and receiving payment
for goods. Barter is seen as the exchange of goods instead of the use on
money.
The system operating in the former socialist economies had to adopt all
the techniques described above as a pure market exchange. In the past,
these exchanges were banned and personal inter-society social relation-
ships were prohibited (Zakhem, 2008; Rosanas, 2008). In such circum-
stances, the only way they could trade was using countertrade to affect
exchange. We posit, however, that these methods can and are used more
generally to overcome market and reputational barriers to enterprises wish-
ing to enter the global market and are used in markets where the legal
system is weak.
Olson (1992) and Ostrom (1990) note that the former socialist coun-
tries had many characteristics common to societies at the beginning of
history. There were few if any courts, and if there were any they were often
arbitrary in their judgements. Governmental systems and coherent policies
(Kleinrichert, 2008; Zakhem, 2008) to facilitate trade did not exist. The
leadership of such states was exercised by dictates and arbitrary power ig-
noring normal social pressures to conforming socially acceptable behaviour
typical in most modern and even very ancient societies (Whitley, 1992). As
Olson has noted, despite these circumstances international trade with such
countries still occurred. The gains from trade are substantial, if not colos-
sal; some trades, and especially those that can be consummated on the
spot, are essentially self-enforcing in that the interests of the parties are by
themselves sufﬁcient to make the transactions happen (Olson, 1992).
We agree with Olson as to the incentives of exchange in spot trans-
actions within one jurisdiction, but where the exchange is between juris-
dictions some other means of building self re-enforcement into a deal is
required. An alternative existed, appropriate to the circumstances of these
countries and based on the ancient past as alluded to by Olson, namely
that of taking and giving hostages to fortune to ensure the good faith of the
transacting parties. An even older example of hostage taking (Schelling,
1960) is where marriages are arranged between son and daughter of trust
seeking renege avoiding parties.
The mechanism by which such supportive hostages to fortune can be
created in the modern world is by use of one of the varieties of counter-
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trade listed earlier. Next to transactional and relationship based exchange,
this third way to exchange is in contrast to both the explicit legal contract
enforcement particularly occurring in formal, legalistic countries such as
the United States, and the implicit social enforcement (North, 1990) more
frequently observed in relationship and trust based societies. He has de-
veloped the idea of the use of such a hostage mechanism for enforcing
contracts and business agreements. If each stakeholder and party to a
contract faces ‘reciprocity’ in terms of hostage or hostages to fortune set
up with the other, then a credible commitment can be established by each
side to underwrite any exchange between them. Hostages to fortune provide
an irrevocable and ‘ethical’ enforcement mechanism that can overcome the
purely economic aspects (Rosanas, 2008; Donaldson, 2008) and oppor-
tunism (Schelling, 1960, pp. 72):
The ancients exchanged hostages, drank wine from the same glass to
demonstrate the absence of poison, met in public places to inhibit the
massacre of one by the other, and even deliberately exchanged spies
to facilitate transmittal of authentic information [...] in a lawless world
that provides no recourse to damage suits for breach of unwritten
contracts, hostages may be the only device for partners to strike a
bargain.
Such a third framework for international marketing exchange is embed-
ded within the aspects of both, the research on relationship based market-
ing exchange (Samiee & Walters, 2003; Li & Ng, 2002; Morgan and Hunt,
1994) and the traditional research on discrete, market-based exchange. It
is believed to contribute to a ﬁrm’s legitimacy by managing its long term
relationships by contributing to stakeholder satisfaction and consequently
shapes the ﬁrm’s reputation. Stakeholders contribute to a ﬁrm’s reputation
and legitimacy. Hence, countertrade, seen as a manifestation of hostage
taking, provides a response to turbulent and uncertain environment that
can be seen as quite distinct from the idealistic world of perfect informa-
tion (Chiou & Pan, 2008; Hunt & Vitell, 1986, 2006; Zakhem, 2008) and
efﬁcient markets or that requiring established trust and commitment based
relationship-marketing. It is not only the stakeholders who are of substance,
but rather the varied networks they become part of.
Emergence, Opportunism, Reciprocity
The issue of restraining opportunism in international marketing has been
an important topic in the work on multinational corporations e.g. by Wathne
and Heide (2000), Rindﬂeisch and Heide (1997), Luo and Peng (1999), and
Gottschalk and Solli-Soether (2012). Transactions between a multinational
corporation, its domestic subsidiaries and other domestic corporations and
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Table 1 International Marketing Typology: Traditional, Relationship and Reciprocity
Stakeholder Marketing
Marketing Type Nature of Exchange Citation
Traditional
marketing
Short term, discrete transactions;
Anonymity fundamental; Control
by law of contract
Gummerson and Gronroos,
2012
Relationship
marketing
Long term, repeated transactions;
Relationships fundamental; Control
by social exclusion
Morgan and Hunt, 1994;
Chattanonon and
Trimetsoontoson, 2009
Reciprocity
staekholder
marketing
Short and long term transactions;
Personal self interest fundamental;
Control by ‘reciprocity’
Landa, 1994; Hilton et al.,
1997; Emerson et al., 2011
governments add yet another layer of complexity to the dealings that need
to be regulated if order, rather than chaos, is to be the norm in everyday
business dealings (Casson & Lundan, 1999).
Government administrations and public enterprises can be as suscep-
tible to the temptations of opportunistic behaviour as corporations, espe-
cially under totalitarian regimes where they assign themselves to the left,
communally orientated, or to the right, libertarian in orientation. The ab-
solute arbitrary discretion of the state in such circumstances results in the
lack of ‘norms’ with no protection from social, legal, or professional sources
(Brouthers, 2002). This discourages enterprises from outside of such con-
texts seeking business within them.
As discussed earlier, such uncertain environment provides neither a ba-
sis for frictionless market exchange nor for trust and relationship-based
marketing exchange. We posit that countertrade or ‘reciprocity’ exchange
of the type we describe does, however, provide a workable framework for
international marketing efforts to penetrate such societies and establish
effective trading links. Such reciprocity overcomes the traditional, purely
economic (Rosanas, 2008; Kleinrichert, 2008; Stevens, 2008) aspects
of opportunism. This paper complements the earlier research (Hewett &
Bearden, 2001; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Samiee & Walters, 2002; Lusch &
Brown, 1996) that discusses the importance of relationship marketing and
bilateral dependence in non-market governance. Table 1 contrasts the three
potential approaches we have outlined in this paper.
Still now, countertrade agreements comprise up to 25 percent of all
trade with the former socialist countries (Frances, 2011; Oggioni & Yves,
2012). Hammond’s (2000) paper provides an in depth empirical analysis of
the continuing prevalence of countertrade agreements throughout certain
parts of the world. He shows its prevalence in the actions of governments
in many developing countries, e.g. the huge arms for trade and the knowhow
deal set up by the South Africans or similar deals brokered by Malaya and
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Indonesia. Traditionally, the explanation given for the continued existence
of such trade has been the result of a shortage of foreign exchange. We
believe this to be a concomitant symptom of the business environment
and not the primary source of the beneﬁts, which sustain countertrade. We
explain that countertrade survives and has grown because it serves the
function of creating an artiﬁcial environment conducive to marketing, trade
and business in settings where otherwise any exchange at all would be
extremely difﬁcult due to the fact that the legal and social systems required
to support it and enforce conformity with the rules required to make it work
do not exist.
In Central and Eastern Europe the prospect or recent actuality of EU
accession may change this for the better, but on the other hand experi-
ence indicates that even existing EU countries, e.g. Portugal and Greece
are not adverse to stakeholder deals especially in the present economic
crisis. In fact, one could argue that much EU international trade and mar-
keting has always been facilitated by such thinking. In the original European
Community, the agriculture of France was effectively traded for the indus-
trial productivity of West Germany, which, as a result of the Cold War, lost
its bread-basket to the East in what was East Germany. Countertrade also
still happens in government-to-government deals, e.g. to balance the trade
between two states or to demonstrate that a political return in terms of
jobs or income has been gained for a particular politically crucial social
group. In such cases, the company/supplier is paid by its own government.
All types of countertrade have built in hostage to fortune (Schelling, 1960;
Williamson, 1983) and through this a mutual irrevocable commitment by
the stakeholders to continue the exchange with each other in addition to
what is required to carry out the primary transaction.
Examples of Countertrade: Reciprocity Stakeholder Marketing
Two major types of countertrade, namely offsets and buybacks, illustrate
the point on the giving and taking of mutual hostages to fortune (Schelling
1960; Williamson 1983; Hennart and Anderson 1989; Mirus and Yeung
1986).
Offsets
Hall and Markowski (1993) provided a précis on offsets originally provided
by Udis and Maskus (1991) who claim that in general, an offset is a contract
imposing performance conditions on the seller of a good or service so that
the purchasing government can recoup, or offset, some of its investment. In
some way, reciprocity beyond that associated with normal market exchange
of goods and services is involved. Direct offsets require the participation
of industry in the buying country in the manufacturing or assembly of the
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item around which the sales contract is written and may include licensed
production, coproduction or subcontractor production. Indirect offsets entail
goods and services unrelated to the exports included in the sales contract
and may include some forms of foreign investment, technology transfer.
A key part of offsets is therefore the fact that their whole discussion
refers to agreements to purchase arms. In the case of indirect offsets, the
credibility of such deals is almost certainly sustainable as the state is a key
contracting party. In both described cases, the existing authority in the state
has a clear vested interest in sustaining the deal. In each case, by accepting
the deal, a hostage has been created by the purchasing government. In the
ﬁrst instance, this is in terms of political leverage with its own population
by giving them access to otherwise unavailable foreign sales. In the second
case, this is in terms of technology for which the government believes they
will be able to deploy to its future advantage. Cancelling the deal in either
case would damage the interest of the purchaser as well as the seller,
as was the case in the ‘Phalcon’ reconnaissance deal between Israel and
China. Israel had to cancel the deal as a result of US veto on the exchange.
In this case, both China and Israel lost face as well as large amounts of
money.
An amusing historical example of this, typical of offset contracts, was
the purchase of civilian aircraft by the former Yugoslavia from McDonnell-
Douglas. This was offset by the purchase of Yugoslav ham by McDonnell-
Douglas. In this example, the well-being of the Yugoslav ham industry was
the hostage. Yugoslavia as a state had additional beneﬁt for its corpora-
tions and citizens from continuing sales of hams, which it would lose by
reneging on the contract. Thus, the offset contract provided incentives to
the purchaser to abide by the agreement despite the lack of legal enforce-
ability that one might have found in doing business with a socialist country
in those days.
Buybacks
Buybacks are another major type of countertrade. A buyback is a type of
joint venture where an enterprise in a developed country supplies the tech-
nology and capital required to manufacture a product and agrees to except
in payment a percentage of the ﬁnished goods that technology can produce.
The participant from the emerging economy provides other inputs such as
labour and production sites. The output that is bought back by the devel-
oped country company is sold in developed markets – thus indirectly provid-
ing much wanted access to these developed markets for the enterprise in
the emerging country (Choi, et al., 1999)
A typical example of such a buyback was the case of IBM supplying
the technology and capital to produce and assemble computers in Hungary
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Table 2 Value Creation Conditions: Reciprocity, Redistribution, Market Exchange
Conditions of value creation Major Characteristics
Reciprocity Under reciprocity, the identity of the exchange partners are
known, with the market valuation, price less important than
the social, psychological aspects of value creation
Redistribution Under gift giving and exchange, inalienable assets are
exchanged, often between actors of different status,
leading to a certain redistribution of assets and value
Market Exchange Under economics of markets, exchange is through money
of alienable objects, products, services between free
actors, agents, who may enact further exchange
(Hilton, et al. 1997; Choi, et al. 1999). In turn, IBM bought back part of the
output from the joint venture and sold the computers in its own developed
markets in Western Europe and the United States. The advantage of such
an agreement was that neither side had an incentive to renege on the quality
of inputs or the efforts, on the energy invested into the joint venture and, in
extremes, could destrain on the other hostage to fortune. As in the case of
offset agreements, there is an element of hostaging between the two joint
venture partners. Both joint ventures have mutually beneﬁcial incentives to
provide their best technology, capital, labour, efforts and to making the joint
venture agreement work. Table 2 summarises these concepts.
Conclusions and Further Research
This conceptual paper emphasised the ‘reciprocity’ in marketing in emerg-
ing and developing business environments. International marketing is taking
place within a context set by speciﬁc, identiﬁed stakeholders and the insti-
tutions that support them. In mature business systems, transaction and
relationship based marketing have been well researched. We posit that in
less mature systems, especially transition or emerging economies, there is
a third way to look at marketing and exchange, which we call ‘reciprocity-
stakeholder marketing.’ We believe that our framework shows the impor-
tance of reciprocity as a fundamental concept for international marketing in
emerging environments such as Eastern Europe.
The concept of thinking about marketing in terms of ‘reciprocity,’ rather
than opportunism, is of assistance to the developing research paradigm
that operates on the basis of a more ‘ethical’ approach to marketing theo-
ries. Countertrade agreements of the type presented by the authors indicate
how this thinking can provide an insight into how export or trade can pro-
ceed in the absence of the institutional framework needed for transaction
or relationship-based marketing. We posit that in a globalizing world more
and more enterprises in more and more countries are entering exporting
and international trade. To do so they may be required to compensate for
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their lack of an institutional base on which to establish and sustain ex-
change by applying a different angle of looking at international marketing
and exchange, stake-holder marketing. The objective of this paper was to
introduce this new way of looking at countertrade in an international mar-
keting context emphasising a reciprocity based relationship in the absence
of a social or legally enforceable one.
The authors identiﬁed two ways in which the raised perspectives are of
beneﬁt. Firstly, there is room for further conceptual work on ‘reciprocity’
and ethical marketing in mature economic environments. Secondly, there
is a scope for empirical work to examine the proportion of exporting or in-
ternational trade that is carried out under each of the institutional forms
that this paper has outlined. As stated: traditional marketing, relation-
ship marketing, and our third category, reciprocity based stakeholder mar-
keting.
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